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Hilary Putnam (1975) famously contended that the extension of many 
linguistic expressions is underdetermined by speakers’ psychological 
states taken in their narrow sense, or individuated on the assumption 
that no psychological state presupposes the existence of any object other 
than the subject of that state (methodological solipsism).1 Putnam 
supported this claim by offering a series of Twin Earth thought 
experiments and appealing to the phenomenon known as the division of 
linguistic labor.  
In this paper, I focus exclusively on the argument from Twin 
Earth. I claim that it rests on two assumptions and that these 
assumptions are highly contentious. Given that both assumptions must 
be accepted for the argument to work, the argument fails. The first 
assumption has to do with what Putnam called the logic of natural-kind 
terms, the second with the notion of a speech community. In what 
follows, I offer a brief description of Putnam’s argument and then focus 
on each assumption in turn. 
“Water” on Twin Earth 
The story is familiar. Let there be Twin Earth, a planet that is exactly like 
Earth in every respect but one: the liquid filling the rivers and lakes on 
Twin Earth, though (almost) indistinguishable from H2O, has the 
chemical composition XYZ. According to Putnam, if a spaceship from 
Earth visited Twin Earth and its crew discovered the difference between 
the two planets, the message they would send home would read: 
                                                          
1 I dispense with the adjective “narrow” in the rest of the paper. The term “psychological 
state” will henceforth denote narrow psychological states. 
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On Twin Earth, “water” means XYZ. 
The same statement would have been true in 1750, when scientists on 
either planet were unable to distinguish XYZ from H2O. Therefore, in 
1750, the sentence “Water is tasteless” would have been about H2O, 
when uttered by Oscar, and about XYZ, when uttered by Twin Oscar, even 
if Oscar and Twin Oscar were in the same psychological state (their 
brains had exactly the same microstructure).  
It follows, Putnam says, that knowing the meaning of “water” is 
not only a matter of being in the appropriate psychological state. 
Knowing the meaning of “water” also involves having the right kind of 
causal connections to the right sort of stuff in the world – in this case, to 
samples of H2O for Oscar and samples of XYZ for Twin Oscar.  
Natural kinds, indexicality and the qua problem 
The Twin Earth thought experiment would not have been as persuasive 
as it was with any old word used in place of “water”. It could not possibly 
work with the word “bachelor”. And, presumably, a story about Twin 
pencils, with cores made of some mysterious substance rather than 
graphite, would not have evoked the response “On Twin Earth, ‘pencil’ 
means something else than on Earth”, even at a time when all pencils on 
Earth had graphite fillings.  
According to Putnam, there is a large class of words, which he calls 
natural-kind terms, that play an important role in explanations. Natural-
kind terms include names of substances, physical magnitudes, animals 
and plants, as opposed to names of artefacts and other socially 
constructed objects, such as jobs. They are taken to feature in many 
inductive generalizations and lawlike statements.  
Putnam maintains that they also display a special kind of logic. 
Namely, invoking a natural kind implies an appeal to a shared (and 
typically hidden) nature that accounts for manifest characteristics of the 
kind’s members. Thus, any ostensive definition of a natural-kind term 
carries with it a defeasible empirical presupposition that the indicated 
sample of the term’s extension bears a same-kind relation to most of the 
stuff to which the term has been applied on other occasions.  
Putnam’s discussion is somewhat confusing, though. An ostensive 
definition of any general term carries with it a defeasible presupposition 
of the type mentioned above. If I say “This kind of writing implement is 
called a pencil” and point to a pen that merely looks like a pencil, my 
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definition will not be valid, precisely because the pen I have indicated 
does not bear the appropriate same-kind relation to objects most 
members of my language community call pencils. Furthermore, one can 
define practically any non-empty general term via ostension: this is a 
bachelor, that is a bachelor, etc.  
What is relevant to the Twin Earth argument is only that some 
general terms, including natural-kind names, such as “water”, have, as 
Putnam put it: 
an unnoticed indexical component: “water” is stuff that bears a certain 
similarity relation to the water around here. Water at another time or in 
another place or even in another possible world has to bear the relation sameL 
to our “water” in order to be water. (Putnam, 1975, p. 152) 
Therefore, what Putnam calls the logic of natural-kind terms should 
really be called the logic of indexicality. This is because, on Putnam’s 
account, some names of artefacts have an indexical component, whereas 
some natural-kind terms do not. As to the former, recall Putnam’s 
discussion of Rogers Albritton’s live pencils example: If we discovered 
that pencils on Twin Earth were organisms, we would refrain from 
calling them pencils, unless of course we discovered that pencils on Earth 
were also alive (Putnam, 1975, pp. 161-162). “A Mercedes” would be a 
less controversial illustration.  
There are two distinct reasons why it is not the case that all 
natural-kind terms are indexical on Putnam’s view. First, some names of 
natural kinds, such as “sand” and “air”, do not seem to presuppose any 
particular nature shared by all their referents. This is so, even though we 
standardly explain the referents’ manifest qualities by appealing to 
microstructure. Second, whether or not a word exhibits indexicality 
depends on language users. Indeed, according to Putnam, some natural-
kind words that begin their career as equivalent to clusters of 
descriptions can subsequently become indexical (and, presumably, the 
other way around). For all we know, “water” may have initially meant 
something like “colorless, tasteless, odorless liquid that quenches thirst”.  
To complicate things further, Putnam believes that many different 
senses of the word “water” coexist and many of those senses are 
indexical. This is because “X bears the relation sameL to y just in case (1) 
x and y are both liquids, and (2) x and y agree in important physical 
properties. . . . Importance is an interest-relative notion” (Putnam, 1975, 
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p. 157). Presumably, the fact that structural properties are “normally” 
considered to be important implies that, in its core sense, “water” 
denotes H2O.2 In some senses, samples of H2O with impurities are water, 
in others not; in some senses, ice counts as water, in others not, etc. These 
differences in extension result from interest-relativity. 
What is the relationship between the Twin Earth thought 
experiments and Putnam’s account of indexicality of some natural-kind 
terms? I suggest that the experiments are taken to confirm the theory, 
though, of course, cannot establish its truth. Our referential judgments 
are regarded as the theory’s explananda, and indexicality is supposed to 
account for them. This raises two kinds of questions: about the existence 
of the target phenomena (e.g., do our referential dispositions comport 
with the theory’s predictions?) and about the theory’s ability to explain 
them, if they exist. In this part of the paper, I focus on the latter kind of 
questions, so I temporarily grant that our responses to Twin Earth 
scenarios agree with Putnam’s. 
There are three major difficulties here. The first is that the world 
may not have the natural-kind structure required by Putnam’s account. 
Secondly, even if the world has the appropriate natural-kind structure, 
there are an indefinite number of widely differing, mutually exclusive 
and equally intuitive construals of reference transmission, the choice of 
which profoundly affects extension. In other words, in light of the first 
two problems, Putnam’s theory may fail to explain the target 
phenomena. Thirdly, there may be an account of meaning that explains 
the target phenomena at least as well as Putnam’s account, but in an 
internalist way. In other words, Putnam’s account may not be the best 
explanation of the target phenomena. Although all these worries are 
equally important, I will restrict attention to the first. 
In a recent paper, Sören Häggqvist and Åsa Wikforss 
(forthcoming) argue persuasively that the Kripke-Putnam account of 
natural-kind terms relies on microessentialism, a view according to 
which objects or samples of substances falling under a single natural kind 
all share a common microstructure that explains their macroscopic 
properties and is necessary throughout modal space. But 
microessentialism, they contend, is at odds with our best philosophy of 
science. Therefore, the Kripke-Putnam thesis, which asserts that the 
                                                          
2 Putnam is silent on what makes a particular sense the core sense. 
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extension of natural-kind terms is determined by the microessences of 
stuff present in speakers’ environment, is incorrect. 
The core of Häggqvist and Wikforss’ argument is well-known to 
anyone familiar with the so-called qua problem and contemporary 
philosophy of science. Typically, there is no single structure underlying 
the properties of an object or substance; instead, there are numerous 
structures that do not fit very well with the natural kinds suggested by 
common sense. This is especially clear in biology. As Häggqvist and 
Wikforss poignantly remark, Devitt (2008) is the only author in the 
philosophy of biology who clings to a form of essentialism. Similar 
conclusions are being reached by philosophers of chemistry about 
chemical kinds (see, e.g., Needham, 2000, and Hendry, 2005). 
Following Häggqvist and Wikforss, let me summarize what 
science tells us about the nature of water. First of all, the formula H2O 
does not capture the structure of water, but rather its chemical 
composition, or, in this case, molar proportions. This is an important 
distinction, because structural isomerism implies that different 
substances may share a single composition. For example, propanol, 
isopropanol, or methoxyethane are all C3H8O (and large molecules of 
organic compounds have millions of isomers). Generally, then, chemical 
composition is not a good candidate for a substance essence – we need 
to dig deeper.3 The essentialist may respond by invoking molecular 
structure: surely, she will say, water is composed of H-O-H molecules, 
isn’t it? Well, not quite. As Häggqvist and Wikforss point out, water is not 
usually molecular. Liquid water is composed of H+ and OH- ions as well 
as H-O-H molecules, all of which are in constant flux, forming polymers 
of different lengths at rates that vary with temperature and pressure. On 
this level of description, then, liquid water has an immense number of 
structures. And Häggqvist and Wikforss have barely scratched the 
surface. They haven’t broached the subject of heavy, semi-heavy, heavy-
oxygen or tritiated water. Nor have they mentioned the fascinating 
complexities of water in its other states, including different varieties of 
amorphous ice (LDA, HDA, VHDA). 
                                                          
3 Water happens not to have isomeric structure, but since other substances do, we 
should probably look for chemical essences at a lower level of organization than that of 
chemical composition. 
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If it is so hard to pinpoint anything even remotely resembling the 
microessence of water, then it should come as no surprise that similar 
difficulties arise, in much greater numbers, when we turn to biological 
kinds. It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that modern biology is a 
thoroughly anti-essentialist science. This anti-essentialism is clearly 
reflected in the philosophical literature devoted to the life sciences, so I 
am not going to dwell on it here. Instead, let me recall briefly an 
interesting study by Andrew Shtulman and Laura Schultz (2008), which 
suggests that naïve essentialist beliefs about biological species seriously 
impede people’s ability to understand the principles of Darwin’s theory 
of evolution through natural selection. Given the impact of Darwin’s 
theory on contemporary biology, it is no wonder that biologically-
informed researchers are so vehement in rejecting essentialism. 
Häggqvist and Wikforss’s criticism would be potentially 
devastating against a conception of natural kinds that took singularity of 
common structure to be necessary for natural kindness and indexicality. 
Putnam’s theory is not that sort of theory, however. Here is a quote that 
confirms this: “But the local water, or whatever, may have two or more 
hidden structures – or so many that ‘hidden structure’ becomes 
irrelevant, and superficial characteristics become the decisive ones” 
(Putnam, 1975, p. 1961). The same idea appears in a recent defense of 
externalism by Daniel Korman (2016), who formulates the following 
“default conditionals” that are supposed to govern the semantics of 
“water”: 
(i) If water turns out to be compositionally uniform, then “water” 
expresses a concept that applies to all and only samples of that 
compositional kind with respect to all counterfactual situations. 
(ii) If water turns out to have a highly disuniform composition, then 
“water” expresses a concept that applies to all and only samples of 
superficially water-like kinds with respect to all counterfactual 
situations. (Korman, 2016, p. 507) 
Korman’s default conditionals are useful, because they wear their 
shortcomings on their sleeve. First, they are glaringly incomplete. We 
need at least one more default conditional to handle kinds that are 
neither uniform in composition nor highly disuniform. Second, the term 
“highly disuniform” is vague.  
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We can take care of the first problem by following Putnam, who 
maintained that the extension of terms such as “jade” is determined by a 
disjunction of two hidden structures (there are two kinds of jade, he 
claimed). In fact, we have no other option, since given the apparent lack 
of natural kinds unified by a single microessence, any other move would 
amount to adopting internalism rather than externalism. 
Now, the vagueness of Korman’s phrase “highly disuniform” is a 
different issue. As I see it, externalists have only two options available to 
them. The easy way out would be to use the standard method of dealing 
with vagueness: i.e., draw the boundary between highly and non-highly 
disuniform kinds in an arbitrary manner. Say, at three or seven, to stick 
only to magic numbers. This would make the dispute between 
externalists and internalists a partly conventional and partly empirical 
disagreement, a matter of decision as well as of fact. Although I do not 
pretend to have insights into the ultimate nature of reality, I would not 
bet on the world turning out the way externalists expect it to be. So far, 
increasing scientific progress has been associated with ever more 
discoveries of new structures (see Taylor, Vickers, 2017, for an overview 
of the phenomenon of conceptual fragmentation in science). 
The other option is to maintain, like Putnam, that the boundary 
separating highly disuniform kinds from merely disuniform ones is 
delineated in light of our interests. Generally, then, the picture Putnam is 
proposing is that the hidden structures that determine the extension of 
natural-kind terms are always filtered by our interests. Unless we are 
talking infinities, the number of structures relevant to explaining what 
we want to explain in light of a set of interests is bound to be smaller than 
the number of hidden structures listed in a long unsorted disjunction. 
Moreover, it is arguably an empirical issue (though in a pretty broad 
sense of the word “empirical”) whether a set of structures is relevant in 
light of a particular set of interests. 
While adding interests to the mix is a step in the right direction, I 
do not think it will save externalism. Indeed, it will only exacerbate the 
qua problem. 
As far as the determination of extension of natural-kind terms is 
concerned, interests enter the equation in at least two places: when the 
speaker (or group of speakers) chooses which characteristics of a kind of 
substance or object need explaining, and when the speaker (or group of 
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speakers) decides which kind of explanations are acceptable. Needless to 
say, this is a grossly oversimplified picture of what is really going on. 
To illustrate: When you observe water, you regard some of its 
superficial characteristics as more important than others. For example, 
you may want to know why water is tasteless or how it is that fish and 
other animals can live in it, but, at the same time, you can remain 
unmoved by the fact that water solidifies and increases in volume when 
the temperature drops below zero. Indeed, most superficial 
characteristics of water will probably escape your attention altogether. 
The choice, to repeat, depends on your interests, broadly construed. But, 
once you have selected which properties of water to account for, your 
interests will also affect what type of explanations you will pursue and 
accept. For example, you may prefer functional explanations to 
mechanistic ones (see Lambrozo, Gwynne, 2014); or you may opt for 
observation rather than experimentation, because it is cheaper. Although 
choice of explanans and choice of explanandum are often 
interdependent, it is reasonable to keep them separate here.  
Let me use a toy example to flesh this out. Imagine that you are 
walking through a jungle and encounter an unfamiliar object or 
substance – a tree, a shrub, an insect, a mammal, or some malodorous 
slime oozing from a rock. You study it for a while and decide to give it a 
general name. You say to yourself “I will call this kind of slime ‘shlaw’”. 
You put some of the stuff into a bucket, take it to your village and show it 
to the shaman, who is visibly excited. Suppose that five superficial 
characteristics of shlaw become important to people from your village 
and ten more, though remarked upon, have been largely ignored.  
The question to address is this: How have your personal interests 
and the interests of your community constrained the choice of hidden 
structures relevant to determining the extension of “shlaw”? Answer: It 
is hard to say, but probably not very much. First, the characteristics of 
shlaw that are of interest to you or your community will probably be 
poorly defined (What exactly is slime? What did you mean by 
“malodorous”?) and thereby amenable to a wide range of theoretical 
interpretations. This means that, more often than not, they will be 
discovered by future science to be clusters of properties rather than 
properties per se. Second, they will be diverse: each characteristic will 
most likely be explainable in terms of a different set of hidden structures. 
And, third, there will typically be a large number of explanatory 
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approaches acceptable in your community, with each theoretical 
perspective potentially picking out, via specific idealizations, slightly 
different structures as explanantia. 
Generally speaking, it would seem that knowing the interests of a 
speech community can help us to identify structures relevant to 
determining the extension of natural-kind terms only if the community 
in question is scientifically advanced, for only in such communities can 
we expect the properties to be well defined and the interests to be 
sufficiently well articulated. But this is an illusion. The real trouble with 
interests is that they shift over time, even in scientifically advanced 
communities. Worse still, these changes of interests are completely 
unpredictable.  
With that in mind, let us try to find out what the word “water” in 
its “core” sense might denote nowadays. Suppose our present interests 
and technological development, together with the world, succeed in 
determining a small set of microstructures underlying the superficial 
characteristics of water. Can we justifiably maintain that having one of 
these microstructures is constitutive of water? If so, then what are we 
going to say when our interests shift, our technology changes and, as a 
result, a different set of microstructures becomes the most plausible 
candidate for the nature of water? And if not, then how else should the 
nature of water be determined? 
Given the changeability of interests over time, we can decide that 
the extension of “water”, in its core sense, is determined by the world 
together with: (a) the interests of our ancestors who first used the word 
“water” indexically, or (b) our contemporary interests, or, indeed, (c) our 
future interests – say, the interests of the last generation of our speech 
community. 
Option (a) is implausible, because, as I have already observed, our 
ancestors’ interests were probably too poorly articulated to pick out a 
sufficiently small number of microstructures. Moreover, there is 
probably no way of discovering who those ancestors were, what 
interests they had, and how they used the word “water”. And, last but not 
least, it would be impractical for us to adopt a notion of water that did 
not harmonize with our present interests.  
Option (b) has the obvious advantage of harmonizing with our 
current interests. However, it does not really bring us much closer to 
solving the qua problem than do accounts of reference that make no 
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appeal to interests. As things now stand, there are simply too many 
candidate microstructures to choose from, even if we bring current 
interests to bear on the choice. Another problem with option (b) is that 
it is almost indistinguishable from descriptivism, as it practically 
amounts to asserting that water is identical to whatever satisfies our best 
current theory. And, just like descriptivism, it also fails to stabilize 
reference over time: assuming (b), the extension of “water” has likely 
changed since 1750. 
Just like (a), option (c) blatantly ignores our present interests. 
And do we really want the extension of our natural-kind terms to get 
fixed by something in the future? Moreover, as far as I can see, option (c) 
can help us solve the qua problem only if we adopt a curious form of 
convergent realism. The convergent realism I have in mind asserts that 
science will eventually reduce rather than expand the set of 
microessences plausibly associated with the word “water” (and other 
natural-kind terms). This, as I remarked earlier, runs counter to the 
inductive record. Therefore, choosing option (c) would, in most 
probability, only exacerbate the qua problem. 
Unfortunately, options (a-c) do not exhaust the possibilities. Not 
by a long shot. There are indefinitely many accounts we may explore, and 
many of them would be more appealing than options (a-c) discussed 
above. But, while I like churning out complex speculative theories as 
much as the next guy, I will spare myself and the reader the tedium of 
considering a host of increasingly nuanced accounts of reference. 
Instead, I will jump right ahead to the conclusions. 
Note that options (a-c) are all unsatisfactory, because each tethers 
the extension of “water” to an arbitrary point in time and thereby 
imposes unwarranted constraints on acceptable microessences. Option 
(a) is overly conservative: if our interests are incompatible with the 
interests of our ancestors, the extension of “water” will probably differ 
from what we currently take it to be (it is also utterly insensitive to the 
progress of science). Option (b) is biased in favor of the present and blind 
to future scientific, technological and social developments. Option (c) 
anchors the extension of natural-kind terms at the random moment 
when our speech community will cease to exist. Readers who enjoy 
apocalyptic books and movies can immediately see the fault in that: what 
if our civilization collapses and its few survivors, though still speaking 
English, die out after living for three generations in Dark Age conditions? 
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All this implies that a plausible account of extension fixing for natural-
kind terms must probably involve expanding the set of candidate 
microstructures associated with options (a), (b) or (c) rather than 
reducing it. 
Let me illustrate this by considering an improvement on option 
(a). Suppose, for the sake of argument, that our ancestors who first 
introduced the word “water” as a hidden indexical had interests I1, 
whereas, at present, we have interests I2. Assume also that the set of 
microstructures constitutive of water as determined by I1 and the set of 
microstructures constitutive of water as determined by I2 have no 
common element. This means that the extension of “water” as 
determined by (a) is out of step with current use. 
We can remedy this by positing that the extension of “water”, 
though fixed in the past, includes the endpoints of all metaphysically 
possible trajectories of knowledge development as jointly determined by 
the natural-kind structure of the world and all possible combinations of 
human interests. Although much more plausible than option (a), this 
account yields an indeterminately large number of microessences. 
However, because the account’s plausibility depends on the supposition 
that it cannot exclude any reasonably acceptable microessences, any 
credible account of extension fixing for natural-kind terms must satisfy 
the same desideratum.  
To summarize: Given what we know about science, the number of 
microstructures that can explain the superficial properties of objects or 
stuff falling under a single natural kind is probably too large to determine 
the extension of any natural-kind term. It is so, even if we specify the 
same-kind relation by appeal to interests.  
The notion of a speech community 
Microessentialism is not the only controversial presupposition of 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiments. A second, though frequently 
unnoticed, assumption that is involved has to do with the notion of a 
speech community. This sociolinguistic aspect of Putnam’s reasoning 
was first brought out by Eddy Zemach (1976). 
Zemach observed that Putnam’s externalist formulation of the 
imagined report sent from the spaceship back to Earth relies crucially on 
how speech communities are individuated. If we are liberal and accept 
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the English speaking inhabitants of Twin Earth as members of our speech 
community, then the message should read: 
We have discovered that there are two kinds of water: H2O and XYZ. 
Since, in Putnam’s story, there is exactly as much XYZ as there is H2O, 
“water” should presumably refer to a disjunction of H2O and XYZ. 
Putnam’s description of the situation makes sense only if Twin Oscar 
does not belong to the same speech community as Oscar. 
But what possible reason could we have for excluding Twin 
Earthians from our speech community, given that ex hypothesi the only 
thing distinguishing them from us is that they happen to inhabit a slightly 
different environment? Can Putnam mark the distinction between 
speech communities without begging the question against internalists 
and excluding Australians, South Africans, or the English?  
Zemach is skeptical. Attempts to define language in terms of a 
speech community are frequently circular, because, more often than not, 
a speech community is itself characterized as a group of people who 
speak the same language (see Wardhaugh, 2006). Zemach’s worry, then, 
is that Twin Earthians belong to a different speech community than 
Earthians, because they speak a different language, and we know that 
they speak a different language because the word “water” applies to XYZ 
in Twin English and to H2O in English. 
Zemach’s worry is justified. Putnam does not offer any reasons 
why we should respond to the imagined discovery of XYZ on Twin Earth 
by saying “The word ‘water’ on Twin Earth means XYZ” rather than by 
saying “There are two kinds of water”. And the differences between 
American English and Australian English are both more numerous and 
more linguistically significant than the alleged difference between 
English and Twin English. In fact, as Zemach suggests, the idiolects of 
Oscar and Twin Oscar are probably more similar to one another than the 
idiolects of Hilary Putnam and any other speaker of American English. 
Putnam, however, is not committed to admitting Australians, 
South Africans, or the English into his speech community. He merely 
needs to specify a non-question-begging, intuitive method of excluding 
Twin Earthians. Such a method seems available. 
It is no profound insight that people belong to speech 
communities by virtue of communicating with each other using 
language, among other things. We can exploit this observation to 
formulate a necessary condition for membership in a speech community: 
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if a person belongs to a speech community, she must have communicated 
via language with another member of that speech community. 
Consequently, two completely isolated groups of people cannot form a 
single speech community.  
The proposed necessary condition does not appeal to the notion 
of extension or to a particular notion of language and so it is not open to 
the charge of question-begging. Another advantage is that it may well be 
intuitive. If it is, then we should expect our spontaneous judgments about 
the extension of natural-kind terms to vary according to the extent of 
posited verbal interactions between speakers. As an exercise, consider 
the following two variations on Putnam’s original story: 
 
(1) In a galaxy far, far away, there is a planet that is almost exactly 
like Earth. It is inhabited by people that look like exact atom-for-
atom replicas of us, but the distance between Earth and the galaxy 
far, far away is so great that it precludes any causal interaction of 
the sort necessary for copying. The only difference between Earth 
and its twin, call it Twin Earth, is that the liquid that fills the rivers, 
lakes, and seas on Twin Earth, though phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from H2O, has the molecular composition 
expressed by the chemical formula XYZ. Assuming the story is 
true, does the word “water” (a) refer to H2O in English and to XYZ 
in Twin English, or (b) are there two kinds of water, i.e. “water” 
means H2O or XYZ? 
 
(2) In a nearby galaxy a long time ago, there was a planet that was 
almost exactly like Earth. As a result of a cosmic coincidence, it 
was even inhabited by people that looked like exact atom-for-
atom replicas of us. The only difference between Earth and its 
twin, call it Twin Earth, was that the liquid that filled the rivers, 
lakes, and seas on Twin Earth, though phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from H2O, had the molecular composition 
expressed by the chemical formula XYZ. About a thousand years 
ago, a spaceship from Earth visited Twin Earth, and, at the same 
time, a spaceship from Twin Earth visited Earth. Having 
discovered each other’s Doppelgängers, Earthians and Twin 
Earthians began travelling back and forth, talking on the radio, 
writing letters, etc. Only recently, and to their great astonishment, 
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have they discovered the difference between the two planets. 
Assuming the story is true, does the word “water” (a) refer to H2O 
in English and to XYZ in Twin English, or (b) are there simply two 
kinds of water, i.e. “water” means H2O or XYZ? 
 
Your answers will count as evidence for the intuitiveness of Putnam’s 
externalism if your confidence in (a) is noticeably higher in scenario (1) 
than in scenario (2). I confess that my own responses agree with 
Putnam’s. 
But even if most readers’ answers to scenarios (1) and (2) agreed 
with Putnam’s and mine, this would merely establish that we seem to 
share some beliefs about speech communities. It would not secure the 
stronger conclusion that the beliefs in question are intuitive in any 
interesting sense of the word. Since intuitive beliefs are standardly 
construed as strongly influenced by our biological makeup, it is useful to 
think of intuitions as deeply engrained domain-specific assumptions 
about the world. What makes these assumptions interesting is the strong 
causal connection between  their etiology and our evolutionary history. 
This is why intuition are taken to be practically universal across cultures. 
It is doubtful, however, that there is a folk theory that relies on an 
intuitive notion of a speech community. We cannot claim the same kind 
of familiarity with the inner workings of speech communities as we can 
with the behavior of water, animals, and individual people. We hardly 
make – and we practically never have to make – any inductive 
generalizations involving speech communities in everyday life. 
Consequently, it is very difficult to identify any relevant features shared 
by speech communities besides the necessary condition proposed above. 
Lastly, unlike the words “water” and “animal”, the phrase “speech 
community” has a distinctly theoretical ring to it. In sum, Noam 
Chomsky’s (2000, p. 148) famous criticism of Putnam’s account applies 
directly to the notion of a speech community: 
We can have no intuitions about the question, because the terms 
extension, reference, true of, denote, and others related to them are 
technical innovations, which mean exactly what their inventors tell 
us they mean: it would make as little sense to explore our intuitions 
about tensors and undecidability, in the technical sense. 
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 This suspicion is borne out by how the term “speech community” 
has been used in empirical linguistics (see Patrick, 2002, and 
Wardhaugh, 2006, pp. 119-132). The first modern definitions of “speech 
community” appealed primarily to uniformity of linguistic behavior. For 
example, Bloomfield (1933) explicitly assumes that “within certain 
communities successive utterances are alike or partly alike”, and then 
adds, by way of a definition, that “any such community is a speech 
community” (Bloomfield, 1933, pp. 153-154). Bloomfield’s emphasis on 
uniformity is later echoed in Chomsky’s “ideal speaker-listener, in a 
completely homogenous speech community (Chomsky, 1965, p. 3; see 
also Chambers, 1980). Interestingly, according to Patrick (2003), 
Bloomfield explains both external boundaries and internal variation in 
terms of speaker interactions: “a speech-community is a group of people 
who interact by means of speech” (Bloomfield, 1933, p. 42) and 
“differences of speech within a community are due to differences in 
density of communication” (Bloomfield, 1933, p. 46). In other words, on 
Bloomfield’s view, Twin Oscar would belong to the same speech 
community as Oscar and the similarities between their utterances would 
remain inexplicable. Needless to say, Chomsky and his followers would 
whole-heartedly agree.   
 The advent of sociolinguistics, ushered in by William Labov’s 
presentation at the 1962 annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of 
America (see Chambers, 2002, p. 5), did not change much when it came 
to the theorists’ lack of reliance on speaker interaction. Although some 
sociolinguistic approaches appear to be consistent with Putnam’s 
externalist account, because they either retain the interaction condition 
(Gumperz, 1968)4 or characterize speech communities in terms of 
geographic location, most accounts in the field appeal to criteria that 
have nothing to do with density of communication. Perhaps the most 
influential such criterion invokes shared norms of utterance production 
and evaluation. For example, Labov writes (1972, p. 120-121): 
The speech community is not defined by any marked agreement in 
the use of language elements, so much as by participation in a set 
of shared norms. These norms may be observed in overt types of 
evaluative behavior, and by the uniformity of abstract patterns of 
variation which are invariant in respect to particular levels of 
usage. 
                                                          
4 See the next paragraph. 
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 A striking feature of the many notions of a speech community 
explored in sociolinguistics is that none of them unequivocally classifies 
Oscar and Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities. Even 
notions closest to Putnam’s proposal fail to do so. For example, 
Gumperz’s definition, according to which a speech community is “any 
human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by 
means of a shared body of verbal signs and set off from similar 
aggregates by significant differences in language usage” (Gumperz, 1968, 
p. 381, emphasis added) either treats Oscar and Twin Oscar as members 
of the same speech community or, at best, leaves the matter unsettled, 
because Americans do not interact with Twin Americans, and yet the 
utterances made by Oscar and those made by Twin Oscar are 
linguistically indistinguishable.  
In fact, even the most noncommittal definition of a speech 
community I know of, which stipulates that a speech community is 
merely “some kind of a social group whose speech characteristics are of 
interest and can be described in a coherent manner” (Wardhaugh, 2006, 
p. 119), would arguably be of no use to Putnam, because Oscar and Twin 
Oscar share all verbal dispositions, being linguistically indistinguishable 
from each other. 
Of course, it is fairly easy to modify Putnam’s story so that Twin 
English becomes a distinct language from English. Just introduce a 
sufficient number of differences in pronunciation and perhaps syntax. 
But there are two problems with this move. First, it is now unclear 
whether Oscar and Twin Oscar are in the same psychological state, 
because, at the very least, their brains are no longer identical. Second, the 
string of words represented as “Oscar would like a glass of water” should 
not count as a single sentence, but rather as two: one in English and one 
in Twin English. Indeed, if Putnam insists that Oscar and Twin Oscar 
belong to two different speech communities, the most accurate report 
sent back to Earth should read: 
 
People on Twin Earth use a word that sounds like the English word 
“water” and applies to a substance that looks and behaves exactly like 
water, but its chemical composition is XYZ. 
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Yet the fact that two different words may denote two different 
substances is old news. It is hardly a profound insight that the word 
“water” means water, whereas the word “fire” means fire.  
Externalists can shift gears, however, and insist that the Twin 
Earth story yields a desired conclusion concerning words, not meanings. 
The conclusion would be that knowledge of words does not supervene 
on psychological state, because Oscar and Twin Oscar, though 
psychologically indistinguishable, know different words. Alas, this 
argument faces a similar problem to the previous one. Namely, in order 
for the externalist conclusion to follow, Oscar and Twin Oscar must be in 
different brain states if one is to belong to a different speech community 
than the other. And although the externalist can reply that people who 
are in two different brain states may well be in the same psychological 
state, she will need an additional argument for the psychological 
irrelevance of neurological properties underlying linguistic differences.  
 Externalists can also point out that sociolinguistics is not a mature 
field, and it has not yet produced a good enough notion of a speech 
community. It is therefore possible that a mature sociolinguistic theory 
will recognize Twin Oscar as belonging to a different speech community 
than Oscar. But this misses the point. For, regardless of how 
sociolinguistics will develop, the important thing is that the notion of a 
speech community is the kind of concept that is shaped by the 
investigator’s interests. As Patrick puts it (2002, p. 593):  
 
we ought not to assume SpComs [speech communities – W.M.H.] 
exist as predefined entities waiting to be researched or identify 
them with folk notions, but see them as objects constituted anew 
by the researcher’s gaze and the questions we ask. 
 
 Ultimately, then, both externalism and internalism are viable 
positions in so far as their choice is informed by the researcher’s 
interests. If, however, we choose not to ignore current scientific practice 
when assessing philosophical positions, then externalism appears to be 
the less plausible alternative. 
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ABSTRACT 
WATERED DOWN ESSENCES AND ELUSIVE SPEECH COMMUNITIES: 
TWO OBJECTIONS AGAINST PUTNAM’S TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT 
The paper presents two objections against Putnam’s Twin Earth 
argument, which was intended to secure semantic externalism. I first 
claim that Putnam’s reasoning rests on two assumptions and then try to 
show why these assumptions are contentious. The first objection is that, 
given what we know about science, it is unlikely that there are any 
natural-kind terms whose extension is codetermined by a small set of 
microstructures required by Putnam’s indexical account of extension 
determination. The second objection is that there may not be a plausible 
concept of a speech community whose adoption would classify Oscar and 
Twin Oscar as members of different speech communities and, at the 
same time, render Oscar and Twin Oscar as being in the same 
psychological state. I contend that Putnam’s argument fails because both 
objections are justified. 
KEYWORDS: externalism; Twin Earth argument; natural-kind terms; 
qua problem; interest relativity; speech community 
